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AWAITING DOE V. EXXON MOBIL CORP.:
ADVOCATING THE CAUTIOUS USE OF EXECUTIVE
OPINIONS IN ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION
Brian C. Freet
Abstract: In June 2001, eleven Indonesian villagers filed suit in a U.S. District
Court against Exxon Mobil Corporation for its alleged complicity in human rights abuses
in the Indonesian province of Aceh. The plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction and a cause of
action pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act, both
of which enable foreign nationals to bring international human rights claims in U.S.
federal courts. The U.S. Department of State intervened in the suit, expressing its view
that federal court adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims could complicate U.S. foreign
policy. The State Department opinion raises concern that the Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
suit presents a nonjusticiable political question and is unfit for judicial resolution.
The outcome of the Exxon Mobil suit will reflect the power of federal courts to
remedy human rights violations committed abroad where the executive branch opposes
judicial resolution. This Comment argues that the Exxon Mobil court must independently
assess the suit's justiciability, disagreeing with executive branch conclusions when
necessary. Separation of powers principles prevent the executive branch from mandating
which cases federal courts may hear. Justiciability determinations should instead be
guided by the principles underlying the political question doctrine, which insist that
foreign affairs consequences do not themselves render a suit nonjusticiable. Congress
enacted the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act to ensure that
individuals harmed by violations of international law could seek a remedy in U.S. courts.
The Exxon Mobil court should not ignore this congressional mandate, nor should it ignore
established judicial and constitutional doctrines, merely to accommodate executive
foreign policy interests.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the volatile Aceh province of Indonesia, Exxon Mobil Corporation
operates one of the world's largest and most profitable oil fields.1 Aceh has
experienced varying degrees of violence and unrest since 1976, when rebels
from the Free Aceh Movement began fighting for the region's
independence. 2 In 2000, the rebels turned their attention to Exxon Mobil's
oil plant, contending that its revenues rightfully belonged to the Aceh
t The author would like to thank Professor Joan Fitzpatrick and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal Editorial Staff for their guidance and support.
' See, e.g., Jane Perlez, Indonesia's Guerrilla War Puts Exxon Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2002, at A3, LEXIS, News Group File. In the early 1990s, when operated by Mobil, the oil field produced
one-quarter of the company's international revenue. Id.
E.g., In Aceh, "Indonesian " is a Synonym for Foreigner, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, LEXIS,
News Group File.
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region.3  A wave of attacks against Exxon Mobil forced the company to
close its Aceh plant for four months.4
Following the guerilla attacks, Exxon Mobil relied upon Indonesian
military forces to reopen the lucrative Aceh plant and to protect its resources
and employees. 5  The government of Indonesia, motivated by annual
revenues of over U.S. $1 billion from the Exxon Mobil operation, 6 enhanced
its military presence in Aceh by dispatching an additional two thousand
troops to Exxon Mobil's oil fields.7 Villagers and human rights groups
allege that the Indonesian security forces, which some dubbed "Exxon's
Army, ' '8 committed wide-spread abuses in Aceh, including murder, torture
and kidnapping.9
Based on the military's record of tolerating human rights abuses and
the nation's lack of an independent judiciary, 0 Indonesia appeared unlikely
to hold its forces accountable for the Aceh atrocities."1 In June 2001, eleven
villagers from Aceh filed suit against Exxon Mobil and its business partners
in the federal District Court for Washington, D.C. for genocide, murder,
torture, crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses.' 2  The
villagers asserted jurisdiction and a cause of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, which encompasses the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") and the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA").' 3 For over two hundred
years, the ATCA has provided U.S. federal district courts with jurisdiction
over torts committed in violation of international law.' 4 After a long period
3 See, e.g., Jay Solomon, Fueling Fears: Mobil Sees Gas Plant Become Rallying Point for
Indonesian Rebels, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2000, at Al, WL-WSJ 26608865.
4 E.g., Mark R. Mitchell, Who Knew? Amid Reports of Increasing Atrocities by Indonesian Troops,
Exxon Mobil Prepares to Return to Aceh, TIME (Asia), Aug. 13, 2001, at 22, LEXIS, News Group File;
Perlez, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 4.
6 Perlez, supra note 1.
I Mitchell, supra note 4.
I d.
See, e.g., Perlez, supra note 1.
'0 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE,
INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE-2000 (2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rIs/hrrpt/2000/eap/707.htm [hereinafter INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2000]
(describing the Indonesian judiciary's dependence upon the executive).
11 See id § 1(a) (concluding that Indonesian "military or police rarely are held accountable for
committing extrajudicial killings or using excessive force").
12 Complaint for Equitable Relief Damages at 1-2, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., (D.D.C. filed June 20,
2001) (No. 01-1357), available at http://www.laborrights.org/[hereinafter Exxon Mobil complaint].
13 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Exxon Mobil complaint, supra note 12, at 2. The villagers also claimed
violations of international human rights law and the statutory and common law of the District of Columbia.
Id.
4 The Alien Tort Claims Act provides that: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The Act has been interpreted to provide foreign nationals with
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of dormancy, the ATCA, along with its modem-day counterpart the TVPA,
has recently evolved into a potent tool for remedying human rights abuses
abroad. 15
The ATCA and the TVPA now face a critical challenge. The outcome
of Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. will test the power of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate ATCA and TVPA claims where the executive branch opposes
such action as contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests. At the behest of
Exxon Mobil's defense team, the District Court requested the U.S.
Department of State's opinion concerning the foreign policy consequences
of the Exxon Mobil litigation. 16 In a letter to the court, State Department
Legal Adviser William Taft, IV conveyed the Department's position that
continued adjudication of Exxon Mobil could seriously threaten U.S. foreign
policy interests.'
7
The State Department opinion raises a concern that Exxon Mobil may
present a nonjusticiable political question and will be dismissed as unfit for
judicial resolution.18 A recent California District Court opinion, Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC,'9 demonstrated considerable deference to similar executive
foreign policy conclusions, dismissing a § 1350 suit as a political question
after the State Department noted foreign policy concerns about the case.20 If
federal courts grant undue deference to executive positions concerning
§ 1350 suits, the executive branch will be able to effectively dictate which
international claims may be heard by U.S. courts. Granting such power to
the President could hinder the use of § 1350 to hold defendants accountable
for international human rights abuses and could unjustly deny victims the
opportunity to seek redress for their harms.
This Comment argues that federal courts must independently assess
the justiciability of § 1350 claims, and disagree with executive branch
conclusions when necessary. Congress enacted the ATCA and the TVPA in
order to ensure that victims abused in violation of international law could
seek a remedy in U.S. federal courts. The Exxon Mobil court should not
not only jurisdiction, but a cause of action for violations of customary international law. See, e.g., Doe v.
Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *26-27 (9th
Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
1 See discussion infra Part II.
:6 E.g., Perlez, supra note 1.
7 Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Honorable Louis F.
Oberdorfer, (July 29, 2002), available at http://www.laborrights.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Exxon Mobil letter].
18 As of February 10, 2003, the Exxon Mobil court had not ruled upon the defendants' motion to
dismiss.
19 221 F. Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
2' Id. at 1178-84, 1195-99.
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ignore this congressional mandate, nor should it ignore established judicial
and constitutional doctrines, in order to accommodate executive foreign
policy interests.
Part II of this Comment addresses the evolving use of ATCA and
TVPA litigation as a means to address international human rights abuses.
Part III analyzes the use of executive opinions in § 1350 suits, demonstrating
that the George W. Bush Administration has fundamentally altered the
executive's position concerning ATCA and TVPA litigation. Part III also
analyzes the State Department's Exxon Mobil opinion, highlighting its
inconsistency with previous actions by all branches of the U.S. government.
Part IV argues that separation of powers principles prohibit the
executive branch from dictating which suits federal courts may hear.
Allowing the executive to determine the justiciability of § 1350 claims
would undermine Congress's constitutional authority and would politicize
the judiciary. Part IV demonstrates that when the Supreme Court faced
similar concerns regarding executive control over the act of state doctrine,2'
the Court asserted the power of the judiciary to independently determine the
justiciability of Article III cases.
Part V addresses the parameters of the political question doctrine,
arguing that it is not a vague doctrine of abstention under which federal
courts may avoid all litigation with foreign affairs consequences. Rather,
dismissal is appropriate only in those limited situations where a case
presents the factors doctrinally required of a nonjusticiable political
question. Part V also addresses the applicability of the political question
doctrine to ATCA and TVPA claims, suggesting that the doctrine is
generally inapposite to such suits. Part V applies the doctrine's factors to
the Exxon Mobil suit, concluding that the suit is unlikely to implicate the
doctrine.
II. SECTION 1350: THE EVOLUTION OF ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND
TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION
The Exxon Mobil suit reflects a growing trend among plaintiffs to use
§ 1350 as a means of holding defendants liable for human'rights abuses
committed abroad. Although the statute was enacted by the First Congress
in 1789, it has only recently become a viable legal tool for human rights
21 The act of state doctrine bars courts from questioning the validity of foreign nations' sovereign
acts that occur within their own jurisdictions. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 763 (1972).
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advocates. 22  The Second Circuit resurrected § 1350 in 1980 with its
landmark Filartiga v. Pena-Irala23 opinion. Filartiga has been called the
Brown v. Board of Education of international human rights24 because it
established that the ATCA creates a cause of action for human rights abuses
that violate customary international law. 25  The Filartiga court exercised
jurisdiction over Paraguayan plaintiffs' claims that a Paraguayan official
tortured their relative.
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit adopted an evolving view of
international law. The court insisted that in determining what conduct
violates customary international law, and thus creates a cause of action
under the ATCA, federal courts should evaluate contemporary societal
standards rather than applying the norms that prevailed at the time of the
ATCA's origin.27 Federal courts have since recognized causes of action
under the ATCA for a variety of abuses, including war crimes, 28 genocide 29
unlawful detention, 30  forced labor,31 sexual assault,32 systematic racial
discrimination,33 and environmental damage.34 In 1992, Congress enhanced
§ 1350 by enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which created
22 Prior to 1980, less than two dozen reported cases relied upon § 1350. BETH STEPHENS &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 8 (1996). The statute was
invoked successfully only twice prior to that point. Id.
23 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
24 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute. Some Observations on Text and
Context, 42 VA. J. INT'LL. 687, 687 (2002).
25 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (holding that torture by a state actor violated "established norms of the
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations").
26 Id. at 878. Since Filartiga, federal courts faced with ATCA claims have consistently held that the
statute confers a cause of action for violations of customary international law. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal,
Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *26-27 (9th Cir.
Sept. 18, 2002). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring). Judge Robert Bork's view that the ATCA did not create a cause of action has been heavily
criticized and has not been followed by subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
249 (2d Cir. 1995) (eschewing Bork's "rather categorical" rejection of the ATCA).
'7 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
28 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3, 8
(D.D.C. 1998).
29 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42.
30 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
31 See, e.g., Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *32-35.
32 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
33 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987)).
34 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1155-62 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
environmental harms a violation of international law where the harms contravened the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea).
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an explicit federal cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killings
committed under color of foreign law.
35
The Second Circuit in 1995 again expanded § 1350 liability in Kadic
v. Karadzic,36 holding that violations of international law do not always
require state action.37 The court allowed suit against the leader of the
Bosnian-Serb military forces in his private capacity for war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity,38 concluding that certain conduct creates
individual liability under international law.39  The Ninth Circuit in 2002
extended Kadic in Doe v. Unocal Corp. ,4 holding that Unocal Corporation
could be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses committed
by the military of Myanmar (Burma).41 The Unocal court also noted that
corporations could potentially be held liable for violations of international
law under other theories of liability, including joint venture, agency,
negligence, and recklessness. 2
The prospect of holding corporations liable for human rights abuses
committed abroad promises to greatly expand the use of § 1350. Leading
human rights advocates have stated that ATCA and TVPA litigation
represents an integral part of their strategy to enforce international human
rights and have filed suits against a number of multinational corporations.4 3
American legal methods, including liberal discovery, jury trials and class
action suits, provide additional incentives for foreign plaintiffs to file suit in
" Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). U.S. citizens as well as foreign nationals may sue under the TVPA. Id.
16 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
37 Id. at 239-41 (documenting "a substantial body of law ... that renders private individuals liable
for some international law violations"). The Second Circuit rejected the District Court's holding that the
ATCA was inapplicable because the defendant was not an official state actor. Id. at 239.
" Id. at 236.
'9 Id. at 239-41. Certain violations render an individual "hostis hunani generis" or an enemy of all
mankind. Id. at 239.
40 Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept.
18, 2002).
4" Id. at *35-36. In order to create liability for "aiding and abetting" violations of international law,
the Ninth Circuit required "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime." Id.
42 Id. at *36 n.20.
43 See, e.g., Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 187-95 (2002). Collingsworth, the general counsel and
executive director of the International Labor Rights Fund ("ILRF"), addresses the following ILRF § 1350
suits: Doe v. Unocal; Doe v. Exxon Mobil; a suit against the Coca-Cola Company for their alleged support
of "death squads" in Colombia; a claim against Fresh Del Monte Produce for the alleged torture of union
leaders and a suit against DynCorp Corporation for purportedly spraying toxic herbicide in Ecuador. Id. at
188-96.
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U.S. courts.44 Legal experts have predicted that up to 1000 U.S. and foreign
companies could face § 1350 claims following the Ninth Circuit's Unocal
decision.4 5
As plaintiffs advance an increasing number of international legal
claims for human rights abuses under the ATCA and the TVPA, they will
likely encounter a judiciary reluctant to become involved in foreign affairs.
Whether caused by doubts regarding their constitutional powers or their
competence, courts are exceptionally wary of adjudicating disputes
involving international affairs. In order to avoid infringing upon the
foreign affairs authority of Congress or the President, courts have proven
mindful of the political branches' interests when determining the
justiciability of § 1350 suits. 7
III. SECTION 1350 AND THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF EXECUTIVE
COMMUNICATION
Given the traditional dominance of the executive branch in
international affairs,48 courts have demonstrated a special concern for the
President's foreign affairs prerogatives when evaluating the justiciability of
ATCA and TVPA suits. To determine the President's interests, courts often
directly solicit the executive's views of ongoing litigation with potential
international consequences. 49  In contrast to previous administrations, the
George W. Bush Administration has aggressively employed executive
opinions to defeat § 1350 litigation. The State Department's Rio Tinto and
44 See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11, 12 (2002); Joshua Kurlantzick, Globalism in the Dock: Burmese Villagers Sue
Unocal in an L.A. Courtroom, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 4, 2002, at 19, LEXIS, News Group File.
45 Paul Magnusson, Making a Federal Case Out of Overseas Abuses, BUS. WK., Nov. 25, 2002, at
78, LEXIS, News Group File.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
41 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We do not read Filartiga to mean
that the federal judiciary must always act in ways that risk significant interference with United States
foreign relations."). The court acknowledged that certain § 1350 suit, could implicate foreign policy
matters more appropriate for legislative or executive resolution. Id.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); LOuIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 26-29 (1990); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 31-62 (2d ed. 1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the
President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 158 (David G. Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996).
49 E.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1180-81 (C.D.Cal.
2002); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 361 (C.D. Cal. 1997);
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(No. 79-6090), reprinted in'19 I.L.M. 585, 585 (1980) [hereinafter Filartiga memorandum]; Exxon Mobil
letter, supra note 17.
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Exxon Mobil opinions raise special concern regarding the extent of the
executive power to influence courts' justiciability determinations.
A. Cautious Practice: Previous Executive Positions Concerning § 1350
Litigation
Regardless of their views concerning the scope of the ATCA and the
TVPA, previous presidential administrations have declined to invoke foreign
policy objections to § 1350 suits. The Carter Administration strongly
supported federal court jurisdiction under the ATCA to hold foreign
nationals liable for human rights abuses abroad. 50 The government's amicus
curiae brief in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala dismissed concerns regarding the
possibility of judicial interference in foreign affairs, arguing that judicial
recognition and enforcement of international law would strengthen U.S.
foreign policy by demonstrating the nation's commitment to human rights.51
Although the Reagan Administration opposed a broad application of
§ 1350, it did not oppose such suits on foreign policy grounds. In contrast to
the Carter Administration's vigorous support of the ATCA, the Reagan
Administration advanced a narrow interpretation of the Act. Addressing
Trajano v. Marcos,52 a private suit against former Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter, the Justice Department under Reagan
argued via amicus curiae that the ATCA was a purely jurisdictional statute
and did not create a cause of action. 53 Despite this interpretation, the Justice
Department expressly declined to comment on the applicability of the
political question doctrine or other justiciability doctrines to the Marcos
suit.54  The government brief stated that continued adjudication against
Marcos would not complicate U.S.-Philippine relations.55
The Clinton Administration also declined to oppose the adjudication
of § 1350 suits, even where such suits had potentially serious foreign policy
consequences. In Kadic v. Karadzic,56 the Second Circuit heard claims
against Radovan Karadzic, the President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-
50 See Filartiga memorandum, supra note 49.
51 Id. at 604 (arguing that when a court addresses violations of fundamental rights, "there is little
danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts").
52 Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion).
" Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 5, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438
(9th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-2449, 86-2496, 86-15039, 87-1706, 87-1707) [hereinafter Trajano
amicus brief]. No court has followed the § 1350 interpretation advanced by the Reagan administration.
STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 19.
Trajano amicus brief, supra note 53, at 6-7, 33-34.
I ld. at 32.
16 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Serb republic of Sprska,57 as he negotiated the end of that region's civil war.
After the court requested the executive branch's views of the suit,58 the
Administration raised no objection to judicial action. 59  The Clinton
Administration opposed human rights claims arising under state-law or other
federal statutes only in the limited situations in which such suits conflicted
with U.S. obligations under treaties or executive agreements.6°
Executive opinions concerning the propriety of § 1350 litigation have
proven influential in courts' justiciability determinations. 61  In Kadic v.
Karadzic, for example, the government's memorandum helped allay the
court's concerns that judicial action would complicate efforts to end the
Bosnian civil war.62  Executive communication provides a valuable means
for the judiciary to assess national foreign policy interests and the propriety
of federal court adjudication. Because executive opinions are granted
substantial weight by the courts, however, they could also be abused as a
tool to defeat lawsuits that conflict with executive views or interests.
B. A Fundamental Shift: Executive Communication Under the George
W. Bush Administration
The George W. Bush Administration has fundamentally shifted the
executive position concerning § 1350 litigation, contending that general
7 ld. at 236-37.
I ld. at 250.
5' Id. The Statement of Interest issued by the Justice Department and the State Department
contended that "[a]lthough there might be instances in which federal courts are asked to issue rulings under
the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act that might raise a political question, this is not
one of therm." Id. See also notes infra 122-124 and accompanying text (describing the Clinton
Administration's decision to not oppose the Unocal § 1350 litigation).
60 The Department of Justice under the Clinton Administration opposed state-law claims against
Japanese corporations for their use of slave labor during World War tI on the grounds that such claims
were barred by post-war treaties. See Statement of Interest of United States of America, In re World War II
Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp.2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 1347), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6641.doc (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
The Administration also opposed claims from Holocaust victims on the grounds that an executive
agreement betveen the United States and Germany had created a foundation to specifically address
compensation and restitution claims arising out of the Holocaust. See Statement of Interest of the United
States, In Re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., No. 98 Civ. 3938 (SWK), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2311 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationj6542.doc
(last visited Feb. 10, 2003). In accordance with an executive agreement with Germany, the United States is
obligated to file Statements of Interest in pending claims against German companies for their conduct
during the Nazi era. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp.2d 370, 380
(D.N.J. 2001) (No.1347 VRW).
61 See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp.2d at 948 (noting that the
executive's Statement of Interest "carries significant weight").
62 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the Government's reply to
our inquiry reinforces our view that adjudication may properly proceed").
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foreign policy concerns should prevent federal court adjudication of human
rights cases. The Bush Administration63 has issued executive opinions in a
number of § 1350 suits, often through "Statements of Interest" filed with
64
courts by the Department of Justice on behalf of the State Department.
The Administration has issued opinions concerning litigation challenging
Japan's use of sex slaves in World War 11,65 claims against the Mayor of
Beijing for alleged human rights abuses against adherents of the Falun Gong
movement,6 6 Exxon Mobil's Indonesian 6ractices67 and the practices of a
Papua New Guinean mining operation. These opinions challenge the
propriety of federal court jurisdiction, often insisting that the disputes should
be resolved through diplomatic rather than judicial means.69  The current
administration's apparent hostility to ATCA and TVPA claims has in fact
provoked speculation that the executive branch will engineer efforts to
repeal § 1350.70
C. Rio Tinto and Exxon Mobil State Department Opinions Reflect Shift
in Executive Views
Not all opinions issued by the Bush Administration diverge from
previous executive views. The Administration opposed claims against Japan
63 References to the "Bush Administration" within this Comment refer exclusively to the George W.
Bush Administration.
64 Statements of Interest are authorized under the Attorney General's statutory power "to attend to
the interests ofthe United States" in pending federal or state suits. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2000).
6' Bill Miller, U.S. Resists "Comfort Women " Suit; Japan's War Actions Are Covered by Treaties,
Officials Say, WASH. POST, May 14, 2001 at A19, LEXIS, News Group File. The Statement filed by the
Justice Department and the State Department argued that court action "could have a potentially serious
negative impact on U.S.-Japan relations." Id. The statement also contended that Japan was entitled to
sovereign immunity from suit. Id.
66 Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Honorable Robert D.
MeCallum, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice (Sept. 25, 2002),
http://cja.org./cases/Liuqi Docs/Liuqi StateDept.pdf [hereinafter Liu letter]. Taft urged the Department of
Justice to convey to the court the State Department's views that suits against the Mayor were barred by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine. Id. at 3-8. The letter argued that § 1350
suits can lead to "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." Id. at 8.
67 See Exxon Mobil letter, supra note 17.
61 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
69 In a State Department opinion concerning abuses of Falun Gong adherents, the Department stated
that "[i]n our judgment, adjudication of these multiple lawsuits ... is not the best way for the United States
to advance the cause of human rights in China." Liu letter, supra note 66, at 7. The letter also asserted that
"U.S. courts should be cautious when asked to sit in judgment on the acts of foreign officials . Id.
(emphasis in original).
70 Murray Hiebert & John McBeth, Calculating Human Rights, FAR E. ECON. REv. 18, Aug. 15,
2002, 2002 WL-FEER 24511769 (quoting an unnamed American mining executive's statement about the
future of the ATCA). Repeal of § 1350 has emerged as a potential goal of major business interests.
Following the Ninth Circuit's Unocal decision, leaders of major corporations met to address efforts to stem
future § 1350 litigation. Magnusson, supra note 45.
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for its conduct in World War II on the premise that post-war treaties
conclusively addressed the plaintiffs' claims and precluded further action by
the United States. 7' The Clinton Administration opposed similar non-ATCA
claims when such suits conflicted with U.S. treaty obligations.72
The position that general foreign policy implications should prevent
the adjudication of international human rights suits, however, represents a
new executive view concerning such litigation. The executive opinions
issued in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. make no
claim that the suits interfere with U.S. international obligations or the
executive's constitutional powers. Rather, the State Department positions
contend that possible foreign policy consequences weigh against
adjudication of these suits in federal courts. As such, these executive
opinions create special concern that executive views, if granted dispositive
weight, could inappropriately defeat federal court jurisdiction over § 1350
suits addressing important human rights claims.
1. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, former and current villagers from the Papua
New Guinea ("PNG") island of Bougainville filed ATCA claims against an
international mining group for violations of international law.73 The
villagers alleged that the mining group committed widespread racial
discrimination 74  and inflicted severe environmental harm upon
Bougainville 75 while operating one of the world's largest copper mines. The
plaintiffs also contended that the mining group relied on the PNG
government to maintain its mining venture. In return for providing military
support, the PNG government allegedly received nearly one-fifth of the
mine's profits. 76 Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the mining group
was liable for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by
PNG military forces.77
At the request of the District Court, the State Department shared its
views concerning the potential foreign policy consequences of adjudicating
71 See Miller, supra note 65.
72 See supra note 60.
73 Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1120. See John Phaceas, US Firm Sues Rio Tinto: Miner Accused of
Human Rights Abuses, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 8, 2000, at 22, LEXIS, News Group File; Greg Roberts, Legal
Threat to Bougainville Peace, AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 23, 2002, at 23, LEXIS, News Group File.
74 Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1124.71 Id. at 1123-24.
76 Id. at 1121.
7 Id. at 1124-27.
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the Rio Tinto suit.78 The State Department's Statement of Interest raised
concerns regarding Rio Tinto's justiciability, arguing that continued
adjudication would have a "potentially serious adverse impact" on the
Bougainville peace process, which State Department Legal Adviser Taft
described as "an important United States foreign policy objective., 79
2. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
Upon the request of Exxon Mobil's defense team, the District Court
hearing Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. also solicited the views of the State
Department regarding the suit's potential foreign affairs consequences.80 As
in Rio Tinto, the State Department's opinion raised concerns about Exxon
Mobil's justiciability. Although Legal Adviser Taft purported not to address
the legal issues before the court and did not directly call for dismissal of the
suit, his letter strongly suggested that the dispute was not appropriate for
judicial resolution. 81
The State Department asserted that hearing the Exxon Mobil litigation
would "risk a potentially serious adverse impact on significant" American
foreign affairs interests.82 Taft anticipated that because the Exxon Mobil suit
would scrutinize Indonesian military conduct, Indonesia would consider the
suit an affront to its sovereignty. 83 Taft contended that Indonesian resistance
could curtail the country's participation in the war on terrorism, identifying
Indonesia as a "focal point" for efforts against Al Qaida.8 4  The State
Department letter also argued that the Exxon Mobil suit could disrupt
ongoing U.S. efforts to promote human rights in Indonesia.85 The majority
of the letter addressed concerns that judicial action could impede foreign
investments in Indonesia, informing the court that "increasing opportunities
for U.S. business abroad is an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy."
8 6
To bolster his claims that Indonesia traditionally reacts with hostility
toward perceived intrusions upon its sovereignty, Taft attached a one-page
"8 ld.at 1180-82.
79 Id. at 1181. For general background regarding the Bougainville peace process see Gervase
Greene, The Story So Far: #8 The Bougainville Peace Deal, AGE (Melbourne), May 4, 1988 at 4, LEXIS,
News Group File. See also Roberts, supra note 73 (addressing pressure on the United States from Papua
New Guinea and Australia to oppose the Rio Tinto suit).
80 E.g., Perlez, supra note 1.
81 Exxon Mobil letter, supra note 17.
82 Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
s4 Id. at 3.
85 Id.
16 Id. at 3-5.
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letter from the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States. 87  The
Ambassador argued that adjudication of the Exxon Mobil suit would
compromise Indonesian efforts to guarantee the safety of foreign
investments, highlighting U.S. businesses as especially vulnerable. 88  The
Ambassador also stated that the suit would impair Indonesia's ability to
bring about peace in the Aceh region.89
Domestic and international observers reacted with skepticism to the
State Department's position that the Exxon Mobil suit could significantly
complicate U.S. foreign policy. 90  Some commentators noted that the
opinions reflected the Administration's animus toward § 1350 and the
adjudication of human rights claims in U.S. courts. 9' Other observers
questioned the State Department's motives for protecting Exxon Mobil,
noting the Administration's close alliances with corporate and oil interests.9 2
The State Department's contention that the Exxon Mobil litigation
could seriously impair U.S.-Indonesian relations is seemingly contradicted
by the earlier actions taken by all three branches of the U.S. government.
The State Department, for example, has maintained a long-standing and
consistent criticism of Indonesia's human rights record.93  In 2001,
" Letter from Soemadi Brotodiningrat, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, to
Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, United States Department of State, (July 15, 2002),
available at http://www.laborrights.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). The letter demonstrates confusion
regarding the scope of the litigation, addressing concerns regarding the "extra-territorial jurisdiction of a
United States Court over an allegation against an Indonesian government institution, e.g. the Indonesian
military ... ." Id. The Exxon Mobil suit does not in fact attempt to impose liability upon the Indonesian
armed forces, which were not named as defendants.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Human Rights and Terror, Editorial, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2002, at B6, LEXIS, News
Group File (declaring the Administration's arguments "troubling" and "not convincing"); Mike O'Donnell,
Opinion, Moral Relativism Won't Defeat Terrorists, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2002, at 11,
LEXIS, News Group File (arguing that "the State Department's reasons for dismissal are not all terribly
pressing-or even legitimate"); Heibert & McBeth, supra note 70; Oily Diplomacy, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2002, at A14, LEXIS, News Group File; Kenneth Roth, Opinion, U.S. Hypocrisy in Indonesia,
INT'L HERALD TRB., Aug. 14, 2002, at 4, LEXIS, News Group File.
91 Edward Alden, Unocal Wants Government to Quash Labour Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
9, 2002, at 7, LEXIS, News Group File (quoting an unnamed former State Department official that State
Department Legal Adviser Taft "saw an irresistible opportunity to strike a blow against the Alien Tort
Claims Act").
92 See, e.g., Al Qaeda-Boon to Business. Aceh, Indonesian Villagers Litigate Against Exxon Mobil
Corp., NATION, Sept. 30, 2002, at 7, LEXIS, News Group File ("Will a consequence of the war on
terrorism be a get-out-of-lawsuits-free card for US corporations accused of abuses overseas?"); Heibert &
McBeth, supra note 70 (arguing that the statements "removed any doubt about what drives American
policy toward Indonesia: cold-blooded commercial interest"); Oily Diplomacy, supra note 90 (observing
that the Exxon Mobil opinion "reinforces the impression that the administration is too cozy with the oil
industy").
See, e.g., INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 10 (noting that the Indonesian military
"committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year"); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
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Department officials concluded that Indonesia's failure to pursue
accountability for human rights violations "reinforces the impression that
there would be continued impunity for security abuses. 94 Less than a year
before the Department's Exxon Mobil statement, the then-United States
Ambassador-Designate to Indonesia testified that the United States could not
ignore the lack of accountability for human rights abuses by the Indonesian
military.95 Congress has similarly denounced the conduct of the Indonesian
military, restricting aid to Indonesia's armed forces.96  The federal courts
have previously adjudicated § 1350 human rights claims based on
Indonesian military abuses, holding Indonesian generals liable for their
conduct in East Timor.
97
The State Department position concerning the consequences of the
Exxon Mobil suit thus appears questionable given previous executive,
congressional and judicial action toward Indonesia. In light of these
concerns, courts must not grant executive opinions dispositive weight.
Instead, courts should consider such views with regard to established
separation of powers principles and clear doctrines regarding the
justiciability of legal claims.
IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE: PREVENTING UNDUE
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE OPINIONS
Courts can and should consider executive branch communication
regarding § 1350 litigation. ATCA and TVPA suits often require courts to
address significant evidentiary and legal issues, including ascertaining
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES-1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/288pf.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2003).
9 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 10 ("The Government's human rights record was
poor, and the overall human rights situation worsened during the year .... Security forces were responsible
for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other
abuse, and arbitrary detention in Aceh [and other regions].").
95 Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Africa Ambassadorial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (2001), 2001 WL 1113283 (statement of Ralph L. "Skip" Boyce,
Ambassador-Designate to Indonesia).
96 The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002 continues restrictions on military
aid to Indonesia until the President certifies that the Indonesian government and military improve their
human rights practices. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-115, § 572, 115 Stat. 2118, 2167 (2002).
97 See Todd v. Panjaitan, 1994 WL 827111 (D.Mass. Oct. 26, 1994) (awarding a default judgment
against an Indonesian general for his involvement in an East Timor massacre); Court Orders 14-Million-
Dollar Judgment in East Timor Massacre, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Oct. 27, 1994, LEXIS, News Group File.
In a separate case, a U.S. court awarded a U.S. $66 million judgment against General Jonny Lumintang for
what the court deemed "gross human rights violations." See U.S. Court Holds Indonesian General Liable
for 66 Million, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 2001, LEXIS, News Group File.
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customary international law, weighing the allegations and denials of foreign
parties and assessing a case's foreign policy ramifications. To ignore
executive concerns would complicate courts' tasks while risking serious
interference with the nation's foreign policy. Courts must not, however,
cede their adjudicatory power by granting executive communication
98dispositive weight. The Rio Tinto court demonstrated undue deference to
the State Department. Citing the President's primacy in foreign affairs, the
court contended that questioning the logic of the Department's conclusion
would violate settled separation of powers principles. 99 The court refused,
for example, to consider statements by negotiators involved with the
Bougainville peace process that contradicted the State Department's
assessment regarding the suit's effect upon that process.'
0 0
Permitting the executive branch to dictate the justiciability of § 1350
claims violates the separation of powers doctrine, which is intended to
prevent the aggrandizement of power by one branch of government at the
expense of another. 10' The Supreme Court has described the doctrine as one
that is "at the heart of the Constitution."' 0 2 Excessive judicial deference to
executive conclusions upsets the delicate balance of constitutional powers,
allowing the President to infringe upon both legislative and judicial
authority. Examination of the Court's treatment of the act of state doctrine
provides guidance to contemporary courts, counseling them to avoid
political control over judicial doctrines.
98 See Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
19263, at *73 (holding that the State Department's Statement of Interest was "not conclusive at this later
stage, especially in light of the fact that 'the Executive Branch ... cannot by simple stipulation change a
political question into a cognizable claim.'), citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 788-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[E]ven an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to respectful
consideration, would not necessarily preclude adjudication"); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp.2d 370, 380 (D.N.J. 2001) (stating that "the Statement of Interest is non-
binding on the Court"). In South African Airways v. Dole, the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation challenged the ability of the federal government to review a final order under the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, arguing that the Department's foreign conduct was essentially
immune from judicial review. 817 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the
Secretary's claim, determining that the case was justiciable. Id.
99 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1181-82 (arguing that the court "may not assess
whether the policy articulated is wise or unwise, or whether it is based on misinformation or faulty
reasoning") (citation omitted).
'00 Id. at 1181.
1o' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
'02 Id. at 119. See also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1998) ("Separation of
powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: concentration of power in the hands of a single
branch is a threat to liberty.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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A. Maintaining Congress's Constitutional Authority Over International
Law and Federal Courts
If the executive were allowed to dictate the justiciability of § 1350
claims, it would usurp Congress's constitutional role. The Constitution
provides Congress with both the authority to "define and punish . . .
Offenses against the Law of Nations"' 0 3 and the power to define federal
court jurisdiction. 0 4  Although the legislative debate surrounding the
passage of the Alien Tort Claims Act is sparse,'0 5 the historical record
suggests that the First Congress enacted § 1350 in order to give federal
courts the power to resolve particular international disputes. 10 6  By
empowering the judiciary to address violations of international law,
Congress likely sought to augment the national government's foreign affairs
power, which was a critical shortcoming of the Articles of Confederation.10 7
While a limited legislative record arguably obscures the First
Congress's intent for the Alien Tort Claims Act,' ° 8 subsequent legislative
action indicates a clear congressional willingness to commit the resolution of
international torts to the federal courts. 10 9 Congress explicitly enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act in 1992 to address foreign nations' human
rights abuses: the legislative record reflects Congress's desire to provide a
federal cause of action for "the thousands of victims of torture and summary
'03 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.105 Judge Friendly famously remarked that the ATCA was "a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has
been with us since the first Judiciary Act,... no one seems to know whence it came." lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
16 See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that in
enacting the ATCA, Congress intended to make tort actions implicating foreign affairs cognizable in
federal courts); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that ATCA represented
"part of an articulated scheme of federal control over external affairs"); Dodge, supra note 24. But see
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article 11I, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002) (arguing that in
enacting the ATCA, the First Congress intended only to implement alienage jurisdiction and implicitly
intended to limit the statute to suits involving at least one U.S. defendant).
107 See Dodge, supra note 24, at 705-10. The Marbois Affair of 1784, involving an assault against a
French official in Philadelphia, typified the foreign affairs controversy that Congress sought to resolve
through the ATCA. Id. at 692-96. Dodge has detailed how many of the original proposals for the federal
judiciary presupposed the judicial power to adjudicate issues of international significance. Id. at 704-09.
See also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 475-80 (1989) (arguing that the ATCA's passage reflected America's interest in
fulfilling its responsibilities in the international community).
108 See, e.g., Burley, supra note 107, at 463 (1989) (conceding that "definitive proof of the intended
purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute is impossible").
109 The TVPA was explicitly enacted pursuant to Congress's power to define and punish violations of
"the law of nations." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
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executions around the world."" In enacting the TVPA, Congress also
indicated its support for the ATCA, explicitly stating that the Act should
remain a viable cause of action for foreign plaintiffs."'
The President may not unilaterally override this congressional
delegation of power. As Judge Edwards concluded in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic,"l 2 "[i]f Congress determined that aliens should be permitted
to bring actions in federal courts, only Congress is authorized to decide that
those actions 'exacerbate tensions' and should not be heard.""
13
B. Preserving Judicial Independence from Political Control
Although executive opinions are necessary for judicial consideration
in certain cases, the separation of powers doctrine mandates that courts make
judicial determinations free from political control, even during times of
national crisis. The Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer 114 refused to accept President Truman's claims that the Korean War
necessitated the seizure of American steel mills. 115  Instead, the Court
insisted that the propriety of the President's actions be determined by
established constitutional principles." 6 In Washington Post Co. v. United
States Department of State,"17 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
assessed the State Department's claim that an individual would be
significantly harmed if certain Department records were publicly released," 18
ultimately determining that the Department's contention was unfounded."19
The court concluded that "whatever weight the opinion of the Department,
as a presumed expert in the foreign relations field, is able to garner,
deference cannot extend to blatant disregard of countervailing evidence."'
120
"10 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991). The Second Circuit has observed that current law, in addition to
merely permitting § 1350 suits, expressly favors District Court receptivity to such suits. See Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991) (stating that the ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits
based on other norms that already exist or may ripen into rules of customary international law"); see also S.
REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991) ("Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced.").
112 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
113 Id. at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring).
114 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
.. Id. at 582, 587-88.
116 Concurring, Justice Douglas noted that the Court "cannot decide this case by determining which
branch of government can deal most expeditiously with the present crisis. The answer must depend on the
allocation of powers under the Constitution." Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
117 840 F.2d 26 (1988), vacatedon other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
"8 Id. at 27. The court argued that declining to review the State Department claims would amount to
"an abdication ofjudicial responsibility to unbridled Executive Branch discretion." Id. at 3 1.
19 Id. at 37.
ISo Id. at 36-37.
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If courts were to practice unquestioning adherence to executive
communication, they would enable politicization of the judiciary. As the
divergent views of the Carter and Reagan Administration demonstrate,
121
political support for § 1350 has differed dramatically among various
presidential administrations. If courts do not make justiciability
determinations independent from executive control, § 1350 may become
little more than a political tool. Instead of objective determinations made
according to established principles of law, courts would determine litigants'
claims based upon prevailing political views. Presidents would be free to
defeat human rights claims or, alternatively, force courts to adjudicate issues
inappropriate for judicial resolution.
The potential for politically motivated decision-making and the
attendant judicial inconsistency caused by excessive deference to executive
opinions is revealed in the divergent positions adopted in the Unocal and
Exxon Mobil suits. Like Exxon Mobil, Doe v. Unocal Corp. alleged that a
major oil corporation facilitated the human rights abuses of foreign military
forces.' 22 The Unocal plaintiffs contended that Unocal Corporation relied
upon Myanmar-a regime heavily criticized for its human rights record-to
provide military protection for the company's gas pipeline project.
23
Despite the striking similarities between Unocal and Exxon Mobil, the State
Department expressed opposite positions in the two cases. The State
Department under the Clinton Administration declined to oppose federal
court jurisdiction over the Unocal suit. 24  Following the Exxon Mobil
statement by the Bush State Department, however, Unocal attorneys
requested a revised State Department opinion,125 evidently believing that a
change in administrations could influence executive conclusions and courts'
justiciability determinations.
121 See discussion supra Part III.A.
122 Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
.23 Id. at *6-11.
124 In 1997, the Department of Justice informed the District Court of the State Department's position
that "at this time adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice
or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current government" of Myanmar. Nat'l Coalition
Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 362 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
125 Unocal lawyers alleged that "[a]s in Exxon Mobil, the litigation seeks to penalize an American
company for investing in a country with a record of human rights abuses." Sonni Efron, Judge Lets Unocal
Ask State Dept. to Intervene in Myanmar Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at 2, LEXIS, News Group
File. See also California Scheming, ENERGY COMPASS, Aug. 23, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File
(discussing the efforts of Unocal and other oil companies to avoid ATCA litigation by employing the
political process). There is no indication that the State Department issued a revised Unocal opinion before
the Ninth Circuit issued its September 2002 opinion.
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C. Executive Communication and the Act of State Doctrine: Rejecting
Executive Control
Courts faced with executive opinions in § 1350 cases can draw
guidance from the Supreme Court's previous insistence that justiciability
determinations are not subject to the contemporary preferences of the
President. When faced with the prospect of executive control over the act of
state doctrine, 126 the Court has insisted that separation of powers principles
require courts to independently determine the applicability of this judicial
doctrine.
The majority of the Court has rejected the idea that State Department
views can dictate which cases federal courts should hear. Under the
"Bernstein exception," lower federal courts would decline to dismiss a case
under the act of state doctrine when the State Department issued a
"Bernstein letter" informing the court that it had no objection to the case's
adjudication. 27  In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba
(Citibank),128 six Justices rejected the proposition that the State Department
could compel courts to adjudicate issues beyond judicial authority. 2 9
Justice Brennan argued that blind adherence to executive conclusions would
undermine the rule of law and the constitutional separation of powers.
30
Justice Douglas agreed, arguing that the Bernstein exception relegated the
Court to "a mere errand boy for the executive branch which may choose to
pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others'. '',31
.26 The act of state doctrine bars courts from questioning the validity of foreign nations' sovereign
acts that occur within their own jurisdictions. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 763 (1972).
127 The Bernstein exception derives from a 1954 case in which the Second Circuit allowed the
plaintiff to pursue his Nazi expropriation suit after the State Department expressly communicated its
approval of the court's jurisdiction. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandische-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375
(2d Cir. 1954).
128 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972).
129 See id. at 776-77 ("The Court ...affirms the Court of Appeals' rejection of the 'Bernstein'
exception. Four of us in this opinion unequivocally take that step, as do Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Justice Powell in their separate opinions") (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 724-25 (1976) ("[S]ix Members of the Court in [Citibank]
disapproved finally the so-called Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine, thus minimizing the
significance of any letter from the Department of State.") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 792-93 (expressing concern that the Bernstein exception encouraged cases to
be determined according to constantly-shifting political considerations) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 773 ("1 would be uncomfortable with a doctrine
which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction.
Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict with that very
doctrine.") (Powell, J., concurring).
Since Citibank, lower courts have applied Bernstein letters inconsistently. See Gary Born,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 730 (3d ed. 1996). Born notes that some
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In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,132 the
Court again asserted that judicial doctrines are not subject to manipulation
by the executive branch.1 33 Although the Justice Department argued that the
act of state doctrine should preclude the adjudication of cases that embarrass
foreign nations, the Court refused to accommodate the executive's doctrinal
interpretation.1 34 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia asserted the
independence of the judiciary, writing that "[t]he short of the matter is this:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to
decide cases and controversies properly presented to them."
135
D. Analysis: The Exxon Mobil Court Should Not Consider Executive
Views as Determinative of the Case's Justiciability
The executive branch may not dictate cases' justiciability through the
use of "Statements of Interest" any more than it may through the use of
"Bernstein letters." As the Supreme Court insisted in Citibank and W.S.
Kirkpatrick, the judiciary must remain an independent and impartial branch
of government. 36  The Exxon Mobil court should reject the unduly
deferential approach adopted by Rio Tinto and independently determine
whether the case before it is appropriate for judicial resolution. Failure to do
so would lead to two harmful consequences for the constitutional balance of
powers.
First, dismissing Exxon Mobil would interfere with Congress's intent
to provide a domestic remedy for victims in nations that tolerate human
rights abuses.1 37 If the Exxon Mobil suit is held nonjusticiable, the Aceh
plaintiffs will be left to pursue their claim in the Indonesian courts, which
the State Department has described as subordinate to the executive and
courts continue to grant executive communication dispositive weight for act of state determinations, while
other courts refuse to consider executive conclusions. Id. Most courts, however, consider executive
opinions as merely one factor in act of state determinations. Id. See also Bernard Ilkhanoff, United States
v. Noriega: The Act of State Doctrine and the Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Executive, 7
TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 345 (1993) (describing a district court's implicit acceptance of an executive
exception to the act of state doctrine).
,32 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
133 See id.
34 See id at 408-09 (refusing to expand the act of state doctrine into "new and uncharted fields").
3 Id. at 409.
116 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
137 The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that "[judicial protection against flagrant human rights
violations is often least effective in those countries where such abuses are most prevalent ... Consequently
the [TVPA] is designed to respond to this situation by providing a civil cause of action in U.S. courts for
torture committed abroad." S. REr,.No. 102-249, at 3-4 (1991).
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pervasively corrupt.1  Sixteen House members and two Senators requested
that the State Department not become involved in the Exxon Mobil suit,
arguing that executive intervention in the private litigation "would send
precisely the wrong message: that the United States supports the climate of
impunity for human-rights abuses in Indonesia."
'1 39
Second, undue deference to the State Department's Exxon Mobil
opinion would also signal the judiciary's acquiescence to executive control.
Instead, as the Supreme Court maintained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co.,141 the Exxon Mobil court must assert its competency and exercise its
duty to question executive foreign policy assertions about ongoing litigation.
Such a review would not require questioning the President's motives or
foreign policy wisdom. Although the court should accept executive
statements as conclusive of the executive's position, such views should not
replace the court's analysis.
The Exxon Mobil court may review a variety of sources to determine
whether adjudication would in fact unduly complicate U.S. foreign policy. 141
In Doe v. Unocal, for example, the Ninth Circuit examined a number of
sources-including the Administration's previous imposition of sanctions
against Myanmar for human rights abuses-before concluding that the suit
presented an issue appropriate for judicial resolution.1 42  In Exxon Mobil,
previous executive and congressional interactions with Indonesia, 143 the
testimony of foreign affairs experts 1" and other objective information may
be marshaled to evaluate the justiciability of the Exxon Mobil suit.
138 INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT 2000, supra note 10.
139 Murray Hiebert, The Era ofResponsibility, FAR E. ECON. REV. 14, July I1, 2002, 2002 WL-FEER
5170241.
4 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See supra notes 114-116 and discussion.
141 Courts unquestionably possess the capacity to determine the foreign policy consequences of
judicial action. In the Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court independently determined the foreign affairs
and national security implications of allowing the publication of classified Pentagon documents. New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Concurring, Justice Stewart noted that "I cannot say that
disclosure of any of [the documents] will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people." Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,
642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (observing that a congressional "vote of confidence in the competence of
the judiciary affirms our own belief that judges do, in fact, have the capabilities needed to consider and
weigh data pertaining to the foreign affairs and national defense of this nation").
142 Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, Nos. 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
19263, at *74 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002). In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit noted that the State
Department's Statement of Interest reinforced other indications that adjudication would not unduly
interfere with the President's foreign policy, including the Administration's earlier decision to deny the
defendant diplomatic immunity and a previous State Department letter expressing "repulsion" at the war
crimes alleged within the suit. See 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).
43 See discussion supra Part III.C.2
144 E.g., Affidavit of Harold Hongju Koh, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357 (D.D.C. filed June
20, 2001). Koh, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the
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Unfortunately for the Exxon Mobil plaintiffs, judicial reluctance to
challenge the foreign policy power of the executive branch may prevent the
court from critically analyzing the State Department's position.1 45  Certain
twentieth century Supreme Court opinions create the perception that foreign
affairs are constitutionally exceptional and that courts should defer to the
plenary and exclusive powers of the executive branch within this arena.
46
The theory of judicial deference to the President in foreign affairs was
advanced most forcefully in United States v. Curtiss-Wright, which
famously declared the President "the sole organ of the federal government"
within international relations. 147  Although Curtiss-Wright has little
constitutional basis,1 48  and is no longer strongly supported by the
contemporary Court, 1 4 9 the opinion remains the principal guide when lower
federal courts determine the allocation of international relations power.
5 0
The Exxon Mobil court's reluctance to challenge State Department views is
likely to be especially acute given current concerns regarding global
terrorism and international hostilities. '
5
'
State Department, detailed reasons why the Exxon Mobil suit was unlikely to adversely impact U.S.
interests, focusing on previous governmental positions regarding Indonesian human rights abuses. Id.
145 See generally David G. Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 48, at 25-46 (addressing judicial deference
to the executive in foreign affairs); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES
THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 10-20 (1992); LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69-91 (1990).
145 See Adler, supra note 145, at 25-27; FRANCK, supra note 145, at 10-20. The Supreme Court has
argued that foreign affairs "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984), citing
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). The Regan Court described the Court's "classical
deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy." Id.
147 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). The Court cautioned the
judicial and legislative branches against becoming overly involved in the President's "plenary and
exclusive" foreign policy powers, arguing that "participation in the exercise of the power is significantly
limited." Id. at 319-20.
148 See Adler, supra note 1451 at 25-26 (attacking the opinion as "a product of Justice Sutherland's
imagination"); FRANCK, supra note 145, at 15-16 (criticizing the "sole organ" doctrine as having "no
perceivable connection with the Constitution"). The opinion represented what one scholar described as a
radical shift from the Court's jurisprudence, which had previously subjected both foreign relations and
domestic affairs powers to limitations based on the Constitution's allocation of authority. G. Edward
White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. I (1999).
149 See FRANCK, supra note 145, at 16 (noting that the Supreme Court tends to avoid endorsing the
opinion's dictum).
150 See Adler, supra note 145, at 25 (noting that Curtiss-Wright is likely the case most frequently
cited when courts evaluate individual branches' foreign affairs power). See also White, supra note 148, at
5 (observing that "by the late 1930s federal executive hegemony in foreign relations had become
constitutional orthodoxy").
" A number of commentators have observed that the George W. Bush Administration has acted
forcefully to enhance the power of the Presidency. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Shift of Power to White
House Reshapes Political Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, at A1, LEXIS, News Group File; David
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Despite these compelling non-doctrinal factors, the Exxon Mobil court
should continue to be guided by consistent judicial principles. Separation of
powers principles dictate that courts should independently determine the
justiciability of cases before them. In deciding whether a case presents a
nonjusticiable political question, courts .must be guided by the established
limitations of the doctrine.
V. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: PERMITTING THE
ADJUDICATION OF § 1350 CLAIMS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Although a number of recent § 1350 suits have been dismissed as
political questions, the doctrine is rarely applicable to ATCA or TVPA
claims. The political question doctrine does not allow courts to dismiss suits
merely because they address controversial issues or involve foreign affairs.
Instead, courts must apply the doctrinal factors articulated by the Supreme
Court. An examination of Exxon Mobil's facts indicates that the suit is
unlikely to implicate the political question doctrine.
A. The Doctrinal Elements of the Political Question Doctrine
When courts invoke the political question doctrine, they defer a
determination of an issue to the political branches of government, dismissing
the case as nonjusticiable. 152 The doctrine has been part of American
jurisprudence since Chief Justice John Marshall introduced it to the nascent
federal court system. 53 The Supreme Court provided its clearest articulation
of the political question doctrine in 1962, in its Baker v. Carr opinion.,
54
Although Baker determined the Court's ability to adjudicate the legality of a
state legislative apportionment plan, the opinion presented the broad
contours of the doctrine. Admitting that the Court's previous enunciations
of the doctrine failed to present a coherent framework, Justice Brennan
documented the factors that render a dispute a nonjusticiable political
question:
Rogers, Executive Privilege: Assertive President Engineers a Shift in Capital's Power, WALL ST. J., Oct.
22, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL-WSJ 3409362.
152 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
153 Marshall is popularly credited as introducing the doctrine in his 1803 Marbury v. Madison
opinion. Although generally asserting the power of judicial review, Marshall stated that some acts were by
their nature political and beyond judicial review. See 5 U.S. 137, 176-78 (1803).
114 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
151
The political question doctrine enjoys special potency in foreign
affairs.1 56 The Baker Court noted that such questions are often inappropriate
for judicial resolution, as they frequently defy judicial standards or involve
powers committed to the political branches. 1
5 7
B. Political Question Doctrine and § 1350 Suits
Although defendants frequently challenge § 1350 litigation on the
basis of the political question doctrine, 158 courts have historically refused to
mechanically employ the doctrine, recognizing that its overly broad
application would render the ATCA and the TVPA meaningless. 59 In
determining that Kadic v. Karadzic was appropriate for judicial resolution,
the Second Circuit reasoned that "judges should not reflexively invoke
[nonjusticiability] doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive
decisions in the context of human rights."' 160 As of 1999, no § 1350 suits
had been dismissed as nonjusticiable political questions.'
6
'
"' Id. at 217.
156 See generally Adler, supra note 145, at 35-44; HENK1N, supra note 145, at 84-89.
157 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
158 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 lth Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988).
"9 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248-50; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796-98 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1439, 1471-75 (1999) (noting judicial resistance to the application of the
doctrine to § 1350 claims).
160 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.
161 Bederman, supra note 159, at 1471.
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Recent lower federal court opinions suggest that the political question
doctrine may present a new obstacle to ATCA and TVPA litigation.12 The
Rio Tinto court dismissed all claims as nonjusticiable political questions.163
Citing two of the Baker factors, the court held that adjudication would
express a lack of respect for the executive branch and that the actions of
various governmental branches could create potential embarrassment. 64
Human rights claims arising from governmental and business conduct in
World War II have also recently been dismissed as nonjusticiable 65
Despite these recent dismissals, the political question doctrine is
generally inapposite in ATCA or TVPA suits. The political question
doctrine is not a vague doctrine of abstention that allows a court to abdicate
its Article III powers.' 66 Under the doctrine, a court may not decline to hear
a case merely because it presents controversial or political issues.167 Rather,
Baker requires courts to conduct a "discriminating analysis into the precise
facts and posture" of each dispute to determine its suitability for judicial
161 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1195-99 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 483-89 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing plaintiffs' § 1350 claims for forced labor
as nonjusticiable political questions); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp.2d 52, 64-67 (D.D.C. 2001)
(holding that § 1350 claims were barred by the political question doctrine in addition to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
163 221 F. Supp.2d at 1198-99 ("The situation is thus quintessentially one that calls for invocation of
the political question doctrine."). The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' environmental and racial
discrimination claims on the grounds of act of state and international comity. Id. at 1208. The court's
dismissals were contingent upon the defendant's consent to proceed in PNG and to not raise that nation's
legal bars to adjudication. Id. This contingency was separate from the defendants' forum non conveniens
motion, which the court denied. Id. at 1208-09.
114 Id. at 1198.
165 See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp.2d at 483-89 (dismissing § 1350 claims against Ford Motor Company
and its German subsidiary); Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp.2d, at 64-67 (dismissing § 1350 claims against
Japan). Cf In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp.2d 370, 372, 375-84
(D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing state-law claims against a German company and its American subsidiary);
Burger-Fischer v. Siemens AG, 65 F. Supp.2d 248, 282-85 (1999) (dismissing claims based on
international law, but not specifically § 1350).
166 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
Under Article Ill. federal courts have an obligation to adjudicate cases that present justiciable issues. See,
e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). As Chief
Justice Marshall noted of the federal judiciary: "We have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them." Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
167 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (concluding that the political question doctrine "is one of 'political questions,'
not one of 'political cases."'); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798 ("[T]he political question doctrine is a very
limited basis for nonjusticiability. It certainly does not provide the judiciary with a carte blanche license to
block the adjudication of difficult or controversial cases.") (Edwards, J., concurring).
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resolution.168 Only if one of the Baker factors is "inextricable from the case
at bar" should a court dismiss the suit as nonjusticiable. 169
C. Foreign Affairs Consequences Alone Are Insufficient to Invoke the
Political Question Doctrine
Although Baker v. Carr noted that international disputes were often
nonjusticiable, the political question doctrine does not wholly bar judicial
resolution of foreign disputes. 170  Baker eschewed categorical denials of
judicial power within particular substantive areas, noting "the impossibility
of resolution by any semantic cataloguing."' 171 The Court further observed
that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.' ' 172  17
In Japan Whaling Ass 'n v. American Cetacean Society, the Court
again indicated that foreign affairs implications do not themselves place a
lawsuit beyond the reach of the judiciary.174 The Court acknowledged that a
dispute over international fishing quotas could influence foreign policy,
observing the premier role of the political branches within this realm.
75
Such international consequences did not, however, convert the issue into a
political question, and the Court refused to abdicate its constitutional duty of
judicial review. 176 The Court observed that "under the Constitution, one of
the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk
this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones."1
77
168 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 211-13; Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Simply
because [a judicial] determination will have an effect on international relations does not completely strip
the courts of the power and duty to review the legislative interpretation that supports the decision"); Flynn
v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing that the fact that judicial relief would impinge
upon the State Department's control over consular immunity and could create "diplomatic repercussions"
with a foreign nation did not itself transform the issue into a political question).
' 369 U.S. at 217.
171 Id. at211.
113 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
114 See id. at 230.
175 id.
176 See id.
177 id.
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D. Application of Baker v. Carr Factors to § 1350 Suits
As in Japan Whaling, courts hearing § 1350 suits must interpret and
apply a congressional statute. Neither the litigants nor the government may
convert suits into nonjusticiable issues by invoking the talisman of foreign
affairs. Instead, courts must evaluate the facts of the cases before them to
determine whether a Baker factor is inextricable from the suit.
1. Section 1350's Lack of Textual Commitment to the Political Branches
In determining whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political
question, the dominant consideration is whether the Constitution commits
resolution of the issue to the political branches. 178 Constitutional limits
provide the foundation for the political question doctrine; Baker v. Carr
observed that the doctrine is "primarily a function of the separation of
powers."' 17 9  By identifying issues that federal courts lack the authority to
address, the doctrine helps ensure that the judiciary does not usurp power
from the political branches.18
0
Concerning § 1350 claims, the Second Circuit noted that "the
department to whom this issue has been 'constitutionally committed' is none
other than our own-the Judiciary."'' As the legislative history of the
ATCA and the TVPA demonstrates, Congress intended the federal courts to
adjudicate violations of international law.' 82  No court has found that
Congress is constitutionally incapable of granting this power to the courts.183
178 Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224, 228-29 (1993) ("[C]ourts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and determine
whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed").
17' 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
t80 See Japan Whaling Ass'n., 478 U.S. at 230 ("The political question doctrine excludes from
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch."); Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (arguing that whether a case falls within the political question doctrine is
determined largely by "the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination"),
citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
81' Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (1995), citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d
44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Filartiga memorandum, supra note 49, at 603 ("Like many other areas
affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed exclusively
to the political branches of government.").
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
183 See, e.g., STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 109-12 (noting that no court has held § 1350 an
unconstitutional grant of federal court jurisdiction). Stephens and Ratner conclude that "[t]here should be
little doubt regarding the ATCA's constitutionality." Id.
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The first Baker factor is implicated in § 1350 claims only where the
Constitution textually commits resolution of a dispute to Congress or the
President. Suits arising from wartime conduct provide one notable example.
In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., the District Court dismissed claims against
Ford and its German subsidiary for forced labor during World War II as
nonjusticiable political questions. 184  The court relied in part upon the
grounds that war reparation decisions are constitutionally committed to the
executive branch. 185  Because § 1350 suits generally involve private party
litigation, they rarely involve powers constitutionally committed to the
political branches. Although the political question doctrine may bar
adjudication of a suit regardless of the identity of the litigants, 86 a dispute
between private parties is less likely to raise the separation of powers
concerns that mandate the doctrine.' 
87
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards and Lack of
Policy Determinations Within § 1350 Suits
The ATCA and the TVPA's clear judicial standards further indicate
that certain international torts are appropriate for judicial resolution.188These statutory standards also diminish the Baker concern regarding the
114 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
8' Id. at 485. The court adopted a narrow view of the judiciary's role in foreign affairs,
characterizing nearly all foreign policy matters as political questions. Id. at 483-85. Burger-Fischer v.
Siemens AG, a case relying upon international law, but not specifically § 1350, also dismissed claims for
war reparations as "a task which the court does not have the judicial power to perform." 65 F. Supp.2d
248, 282 (1999). Although the court held that the case implicated all the Baker factors, it relied primarily
upon the fact that the dispute was constitutionally committed to the executive branch. Id. at 282-85.
116 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
187 See, e.g., Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (declining to dismiss claims
against Nicaraguan leaders as political questions, noting that the complaint was narrowly focused and did
not require determining who was at fault in the Nicaraguan civil war); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro,
937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The fact that the issues before us arise in a politically charged context
does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political question.")
(emphasis added); McKay v. United States 703 F.2d 464, 470 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that "the political
question theory and the separation of powers doctrines do not ordinarily prevent individual tort
recoveries") (emphasis added); Eckert Int'l, Inc. v. Gov't of Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji, 834 F.
Supp. 167, 173 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The dispute at bar does not involve conflicts between branches of the
government, but rather a commercial contract dispute between a foreign government and a private U.S.
company. The political question doctrine . . . is generally inapplicable to such disputes.") (emphasis
added).
18d The Supreme Court has concluded that the Baker requirement that a case must present judicially
discoverable and manageable standards is related to the political question doctrine's constitutional
underpinnings. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (observing that a lack of judicial
standards may strengthen the conclusion that a dispute is textually committed to a political branch).
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need for policy determinations that require nonjudicial discretion. 189 For a
claim to be cognizable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, a party must allege
a violation of a treaty or of a universally recognized norm of international
law. 190 Conversely, if a plaintiff presents an ambiguous international legal
claim, the ATCA provides no cause of action. 19 1 The Torture Victim
Protection Act provides an even narrower basis of liability, restricting claims
to torture and extrajudicial killing committed under color of law. 192
3. Inapplicability of the Political Question Doctrine's Prudential
Factors to § 1350 Claims
The remaining Baker elements are "prudential" factors, which provide
less defensible bases for dismissal and are generally inapposite in § 1350
suits. In addition to the political question doctrine's constitutional basis, the
doctrine is also rooted in the Court's perceived institutional weaknesses.'
93
A foremost expert in the doctrine, Alexander Bickel, has argued that the
doctrine encompasses prudential and discretionary justifications for
dismissing cases that threaten judicial power or legitimacy. 94
The Second Circuit has stated that "[a]lthough prudential
considerations may inform a court's justiciability analysis, the political
question doctrine is essentially a constitutional limitation on the courts.
195
'89 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that § 1350's clear standard
"obviates any need to make initial policy decisions").
'9' 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("[Ilnternational torts . . . are characterized by universal consensus in the
international community as to their binding status and their content. That is, they are universal, definable,
and obligatory international norms.").
191 See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the international community had not recognized "cultural genocide" as a violation of customary
international law). Federal courts have a long history of discerning international law. See The Paquette
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
"' Section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 199! provides an explicit definition of
"extrajudicial killing" and "torture" for the purposes of TVPA litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
193 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962) (arguing that the basis of the
political question doctrine is "the Court's sense of lack of capacity . . . the inner vulnerability, the self-
doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.").
"' Id. at 117-26, 183-84 (describing the political question doctrine as one of the Court's "passive
virtues").
195 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d
152 (2d Cir. 2000). Some scholars recognize only the constitutional bases as legitimate grounds for
dismissing a case as a nonjusticiable political question. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-14 (1961) ("[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from
decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of
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Courts' concerns about judicial fragility and other perceived institutional
shortcomings are less compelling in an era when courts enjoy political
legitimacy and respect. 196  The Baker concern that adjudication could
indicate a lack of respect for a coordinate political branch, for example,
should be rarely invoked, because courts are obligated to oppose executive
or legislative actions that contravene the Constitution.197 As Justice Douglas
observed, "[i]t is far more important to be respectful to the Constitution than
to a coordinate branch of government."'
' 98
Federal courts -are not powerless to invoke the political question
doctrine's prudential grounds to prevent serious foreign policy
complications. The Baker Court did not envision the judiciary presenting a
major obstacle to the foreign conduct of the political branches, counseling
courts to consider "the possible consequences of judicial action."' 199 The
grounds under which a court may raise the doctrine's prudential factors,
however, remain narrow. In Kadic, the Second Circuit stated that prudential
grounds are germane in § 1350 litigation only where judicial action would
contradict prior decisions by a political branch and thereby "seriously
interfere with important governmental interests.,
200
E. Analysis: Doe v. Exxon Mobil is Unlikely to Present a Nonjusticiable
Political Question
If the Exxon Mobil court conducts a truly independent justiciability
analysis of the case, it will likely find that the suit does not implicate the
political question doctrine. First, the Exxon Mobil litigation does not involve
government than the courts."). But see Goldwater v. Carter 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (determining whether
"prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention") (Powell, J., concurring).
196 See Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question ": A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524,
530 (1987). Henkin argues that there is no modem justification for use of the doctrine "as a means of
escape for fearful judges unwilling to address challenges to governmental usurpation of authority in foreign
affairs." Id. See also Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 A.J.I.L.
814, 816 (1989) ("Few today could seriously believe, for example, that the Court places itself at risk by
deciding a controversial case. It may have been true, before widespread public acceptance of judicial
review, that an overzealous judiciary might have gotten 'too far out in front' to continue to act as final legal
arbiter. But that day has long passed.").
19' See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cit. 1981) ("[T]he Judiciary's conclusions may differ
from the Executive's in many areas of law, yet that does not mean that whenever the courts might disagree
with the Executive the issue thereby becomes a non-justiciable 'political question."'); United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541, 555 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("[I]t is central to the rule of law in our constitutional
system that federal courts must, in appropriate circumstances, review or second guess, and indeed
sometimes trunmp, the actions of other governmental branches.").
198 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 894 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
199 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
200 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
VOL. 12 No. 2
EXECUTIVE OPINIONS IN ATCA LITIGATION
a dispute that is constitutionally committed to the political branches. Even
the Rio Tinto court, faced with similar executive opposition to federal court
jurisdiction, did not contend that the federal judiciary was constitutionally
powerless to address the issues in question.2 °' Exxon Mobil neither
challenges an exercise of U.S. foreign policy nor requires executive
resolution. The case is distinguishable, for example, from Iwanowa v. Ford,
which involved claims implicating the executive's authority to address war
reparations.2 °2 The fact that the Exxon Mobil plaintiffs assert liability
against only private entities further decreases the likelihood that the case
presents a political question.
Secondly, Exxon Mobil presents judicially discoverable and
manageable standards that allow the court to adjudicate the suit. These
standards allow the court to hear the plaintiffs' claims without making policy
determinations. The Exxon Mobil plaintiffs allege genocide, torture and
crimes against humanity,20 3 all of which have been recognized as violations
of international law that create causes of action under § 1350.204 If the
Exxon Mobil court holds that it is unable to discern international law or to
determine liability based upon international events, its decision will
represent a direct attack on the competency of the judiciary.
Finally, an objective examination of Exxon Mobil's facts suggests that
the case would not unduly complicate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
The suit will not contradict previous action by a political branch. In fact, the
executive branch, including the State Department, has consistently criticized
Indonesia for the human rights abuses committed by its military.20 5 The
legislative and judicial branches have similarly censured Indonesia for its
poor human rights record.20 6 Accordingly, any indirect criticism of the
Indonesian forces which may arise from a suit against Exxon Mobil and its
subsidiaries is highly unlikely to disrupt critical American foreign affairs
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The aims of the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act are not uniformly supported by political actors. However,
201 The Rio Tinto court instead relied upon the prudential grounds that adjudication would complicate
U.S. foreign policy. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1197-98 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
'o' Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 2001).203 Exxon Mobil complaint, supra note 12, at 1-2.
204 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
205 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
MARCH 2003
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
neither the controversial nature of these acts, nor the presence of
international issues allow federal courts to disregard congressional intent,
constitutional or judicial doctrines, or the text of the Constitution. In order
to maintain the balance of constitutional powers between the branches of
government, the Exxon Mobil court must independently determine its ability
to hear the case. As the Supreme Court insisted in Citibank and WS.
Kirkpatrick, the judiciary must remain an autonomous and impartial branch
of government. 207 Although the President's foreign policy powers are
significant, and deserve substantial respect, they are not absolute. Curtiss-
Wright's vision of an executive hegemony in foreign affairs is contradicted
by the Constitution's sharing of governmental power. If objective evidence
contradicts State Department conclusions regarding Exxon Mobil's foreign
policy consequences, the court must not simply defer to the President. For
the court to dismiss Exxon Mobil as a political question upon executive
request degrades the doctrine and the judiciary itself.
If the Exxon Mobil court asserts its power to determine the case's
justiciability free from political control, it will likely find that the case does
not implicate the political question doctrine. The core constitutional basis
for the doctrine does not preclude federal court adjudication because the
Constitution does not exclusively reserve the resolution of international
human rights abuses for the executive branch. Even if one accepts the
doctrine's prudential factors, there is little indication that Exxon Mobil
would pose serious foreign policy consequences. Indeed, any criticism of
Indonesian military abuses that exists in the Exxon Mobil litigation would be
entirely consistent with the practices of all branches of the U.S. government.
Thomas Franck, in his work criticizing excessive judicial deference
within foreign affairs, argues that the United States' primary international
strength is its rule of law.20 8 "To make the law's writ inoperable at the
water's edge," Franck argues, "is nothing less than an exercise in unilateral
moral disarmament., 20 9 To suspend established legal principles in order to
deny the Aceh plaintiffs access to a judicial forum would represent a further
injustice.
207 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
208 FRANCK, supra note 145, at 159.
209 id.
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